A dangerous precedent indeed - a response to CR Snyman's note on Masiya by Phelps, K
A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT INDEED — A RESPONSE TO
C R SNYMAN’S NOTE ON MASIYA*
K PHELPS
Lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of Cape Town
INTRODUCTION
Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) (hereafter Masiya)
is inherently controversial. The facts of the case, the unlawful anal
penetration of a 9-year-old girl, strike at the heart of our social fabric. The
legal issues at stake, such as the principle of legality, the separation of powers
and the Constitution, strike at the heart of our legal order. It is thus
unsurprising that the judgment in Masiya has elicited critical commentary.
This is a direct response to one such comment, C R Snyman’s recent note
‘Extending the scope of rape — A dangerous precedent’ (2007) 124 SALJ
677 (hereafter ‘Snyman’). Snyman addresses the following four issues in his
note as they pertain to the judgment in Masiya: the principle of legality;
separation of powers; the constitutionality of the common-law definition of
rape; and whether the court was unduly swayed by emotional consider-
ations. This comment refutes his stance and the reasoning employed in
relation to each of these issues.
Snyman and the present author do agree on one thing, however: that the
majority judgment in Masiya is unconvincing. To borrow his words, ‘[t]he
decision on the law in this case fills one with a sense of unease’ (Snyman at
677). It is our explanation of why that is different. He argues that the court
‘overstepped its judicial function and violated the principle of legality when
it extended the ambit of rape’ (Snyman at 677–8). I argue quite the opposite:
that the court did not proceed boldly enough with its judicial function, that
is, to bring the law into line with the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, 1996, and that the principle of legality is no barrier to this.
Findings of the Constitutional Court
In order to place the following discussion in context it is helpful briefly to
restate the facts and findings of the Constitutional Court. The applicant, Mr
Masiya, was tried and convicted in a magistrate’s court on the charge of rape
of a 9-year-old girl. Her testimony and the medical evidence indicated that
she had been anally penetrated by the accused. The magistrate nonetheless
convicted Mr Masiya of rape, which conviction the High Court upheld on
the grounds that the common-law definition of rape was unconstitutional.
The common-law definition of rape was thus developed along gender-
neutral lines. The matter was then referred to the Constitutional Court for
confirmation.
* My thanks to Professor Jonathan Burchell for the many discussions he engaged
in with me while this comment was being written. The views expressed here remain
my own.
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The majority, in the judgment of Nkabinde J (in which Moseneke DCJ,
Kondile AJ, Madala J, Mokgoro J, O’Regan J, Van der Westhuizen J, Yacoob
J and Van Heerden AJ concurred), found that the common-law definition of
rape was constitutional in so far as it criminalized conduct that was clearly
socially unacceptable (Masiya para 27). The definition was nonetheless found
to fall short of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights (s 39(2) the
Constitution), therefore requiring adaptation (ibid). The common-law
definition of rape was thus developed incrementally to include ‘acts of
non-consensual penetration of a penis into the anus of a female’ (para 74). In
his dissenting judgment Langa CJ (with whom Sachs J concurred) held that it
was possible to extend the definition of rape to include the anal penetration
of men without specifically dealing with the constitutionality of the
common-law definition. This is curious, considering that the judgment goes
on to consider various rights in the Bill of Rights in advocating for a
gender-neutral definition of rape.
This comment is not directly about the case of Masiya or the merits of
various possible definitions of the crime of rape. Rather, the case provides
the context for a broader discussion of the principles of law that have been
raised as a result of the judgment. The definition of rape was finally changed a
matter of months after the Masiya judgment was handed down when the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of
2007 came into force in December 2007. This Act arguably filled the lacunae
that existed in the crime of rape by providing a more expansive definition. It
has not, however, resolved debates surrounding the legal issues raised by
Masiya.
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
The focus of the majority judgment in Masiya regarding the principle of
legality is clearly on the prohibition on retrospective application of the law,
with little depth of discussion provided on whether the principle permits
development of the common-law definitions of crimes at all. It cannot have
viewed this aspect of the principle as problematic, however, as it did develop
the definition of rape to include the anal penetration of females. This
decision, despite failing to substantiate the courts’ ability to develop
common-law crimes, implicitly acknowledges that such development does
not infringe the legality principle.
Snyman on legality
Despite the court’s implicit acceptance of its ability to develop the
common-law definition of crimes, certain commentators believe that the
principle of legality prohibits courts from effecting such development (see for
example Shannon Hoctor ‘Recent cases: Specific crimes’ (2007) 20 SACJ 78
at 81). Snyman provides scathing criticism of the Constitutional Court on
this basis (Snyman, and see also C R Snyman Criminal Law 5 ed (2008) 46–7
(hereafter Criminal Law (2008)). According to his line of reasoning,
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developing the definition of rape along gender-neutral lines, or any lines,
would fall foul of the principle of legality and the courts’ role in the
separation of powers: ‘The principle of legality should be regarded as barring
not only the creation of new crimes by courts, but also as barring the
extension by the courts of the definitions of existing ones’ (Snyman at 682).
Hoctor op cit at 86 has put forward a similar argument:
‘[I]t should be recognized that there is a crucial difference between the
legitimate and vital role of the courts in striking down criminal law rules which
are unconstitutional and the act of extending the bounds of existing crimes,
which founders on the principle of legality. . . . [I]t remains unacceptable that a
court should disregard the principle of legality in usurping the function of the
legislature.’
If this is indeed the correct interpretation of the principle of legality, then the
Constitutional Court did infringe the principle by affecting an extension of
the definition of rape. However, this understanding of legality is unduly rigid
and not in keeping with the supremacy of our Constitution.
The core common-law features of the principle of legality are similarly
defined by both Professors Burchell and Snyman (see Jonathan Burchell
Principles of Criminal Law rev 3 ed (2006) 96–104 and C R Snyman Criminal
Law 4 ed (2002) 39 (hereafter Criminal Law (2002)) and Criminal Law (2008)
36), viz:
1. Crimes and their punishments must be created by a properly made law
explicitly identifying the conduct as a crime.
2. There must be some punishment affixed to the commission of the act;
3. The definition of the common law and statutory crimes should be
reasonably precise and settled.
4. Penal statutes should be strictly construed;
5. The law should be accessible;
6. The punishment for offences must be prescribed by law; and
7. Criminal laws must have a prospective operation, to state otherwise,
there can be no punishment imposed retrospectively.
It is not immediately apparent from the above list that the principle of legality
permits no development of the scope of common-law definitions of crimes,
as Snyman would have us believe. In fact, to satisfy (3) it may on occasion be
necessary to develop the scope of a crime in order, for example, to make it
precise or settle discrepancies in different sources of law:
‘The definitions of [common-law] crimes find their authoritative expression in
the decisions of the courts and books of authority. Since judges and scholars
may differ in their interpretation or understanding of these sources as they
relate to the existence of a crime or definition of the elements of a crime, there
always exists a measure of uncertainty as to the exact ambit or scope of a
common-law crime.’ (Burchell op cit 100)
The principle of legality has always permitted courts to develop the scope
of common-law crimes by recognizing behaviour that had not previously
been recognized within the definition (Kelly Phelps & Sha’ista Kazee ‘The
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Constitutional Court gets anal about rape — Gender neutrality and the
principle of legality in Masiya v DPP’ (2007) 20 SACJ 341 at 353–4). To say
otherwise would render the law irrelevant to a changing modern society.
An example of case law that substantiates this stance is cases concerning the
theft of credit. The common-law definition of the crime of theft has been
found to include the theft of credit despite the fact that this type of theft had
not previously been recognized within the definition (Criminal Law (2008)
45). Thus the Appellate Division stated in R v Solomon 1953 (4) SA 518 (A) at
522G-H: ‘It must be borne in mind that, under our modern system of
banking and paying by cheque or kindred process, the question of ownership
in specific coins no longer arises in cases where resort to that system is made.’
Reference is made to this and other similar decisions in S v Graham 1975 (3)
SA 569 (A) at 577pr:
‘The foregoing decisions have not escaped academic criticism, but they stand
as judgments of this Court. They were referred to in the arguments in the
instant case without criticism and I need say no more than that I am
unpersuaded that they are manifestly wrong. They are therefore binding.’
It has been suggested (see for example Hoctor op cit at 81) that these
decisions can be explained by the fact that they predated the Constitution
and, now that the principle of legality is enshrined in the Constitution (ss 1(c)
and 35(3)(l), (m) and (n)), courts would no longer be able to tamper with the
definitions of crimes. With respect, this cannot be the correct interpretation
of these precedents. Such a stance implies either that before the principle of
legality became a constitutional principle it was different in nature, or that it
was in some way easier or more permissible to disregard its provisions.
However, the principle of legality is a cornerstone of the rule-of-law
doctrine (Hoctor op cit at 79). ‘As such, it must be accepted that it was a
fundamental and binding principle of law before the Constitution and it
remains so after the Constitution’ (Phelps & Kazee op cit at 351). Thus, the
only way to understand these precedents is that the principle of legality has
always permitted development of the scope of common-law crimes by
recognizing new forms of behaviour that are consonant with existing
definitions. To understand the principle any other way would render the
common law stagnant and irrelevant, incapable of accommodating new
forms of conduct in modern society.
A similar example to the theft of credit is the crime of defeating or
obstructing the course of justice. Although South African courts adopted
English terminology with respect to the definition of this crime, it was the
Roman-Dutch authorities that informed the substance and boundaries of the
offence (Burchell op cit 939–40). Since the notion of a police service did not
exist at the time of the Roman-Dutch authorities, it is unsurprising that the
crime was confined to judicial proceedings. Nonetheless, our courts have
seen fit to recognize obstruction of the police within the boundaries of the
common-law definition. In S v Burger 1975 (2) SA 601 (C) at 616 in fine
Baker J explicitly reasoned that this approach did not offend the principle of
legality but merely adapted the crime to modern circumstances:
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‘What is of importance are the principles enumerated in the cases, not the
specific instances of the offence of defeating or obstructing the course of
justice. . . . The law grows and develops as time passes; it does not stand still.
Since the time of the Roman-Dutch writers great developments have taken
place in the field of criminal law. One of the most important of these is that we
today have appointed civil servants whose duty it is to investigate alleged
offences; and to see to it that they are properly tried in public. The police
investigate alleged offences; the docket is submitted to the Attorney-General;
he decides whether or not a prosecution should be instituted. It is as equally
serious to prevent an investigation from taking place as it is to attempt to
influence the investigation after it has commenced, or to attempt to influence
the course of a trial in order to obtain the accused’s acquittal. All three types of
conduct materially amount to the undermining of the course of justice.’
The above judgment was applied with approval by Macdonald CJ in S v
Greenstein 1977 (3) SA 220 (RA) at 224D-F, who went on to state:
‘These processes have undergone fundamental changes since Roman times
and, while the basic principles underlying the offence remain unaltered, they
must necessarily be applied in very different circumstances at present. The
Roman law offences related almost exclusively to the trial stage and thus it was
not illogical that the condition precedent in the form of a particular state of
mind on the part of the accused should also relate to this stage of the
proceedings. In modern systems of law, the administration of justice, has with
the development of police forces, become increasingly involved in the
investigation and prevention of crime. I agree with the view expressed by
CENTLIVRES, J., in R. v. Adey and Hancock (1), 1938 (1) P.H. H75, that:
‘‘It would be lamentable if the Court were to lay down that, when the police
were investigating a suspected crime, anybody who tried to obstruct or
thwart the administration of justice by persuading people to put false
information before the police was not liable to be charged with the crime of
attempting to defeat the due course of justice.’’ ’
This stance has also received academic approval: ‘This would seem to be
correct in principle. The detection, apprehension and charging of offenders
is plainly part of the process of the administration of justice in a modern legal
system’ (Burchell op cit 944).
The only difference the constitutional inclusion of the legality principle
should be seen as introducing is the explicit recognition of a new ground on
which the common-law definitions of crimes can be extended by the courts.
Before the democratic Constitution, the only clear justification for courts to
extend the scope of common-law crimes was the inclusion of new forms of
behaviour (like dealing in credit or obstructing the police) that could be read
into the existing definition. This ensures that the law remains relevant in a
changing society and prevents the common-law definitions of crimes from
being relegated to the annals of history. Since the advent of our supreme,
justiciable Constitution there is a second ground for developing common-
law crimes: to bring the common law into line with the Constitution itself,
especially the rights contained in the Bill of Rights. This assertion is further
supported by the existence of s 39(2) of the Constitution: ‘When interpret-
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ing any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law,
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects
of the Bill of Rights.’
Section 39(2) of the Constitution
It has been established that Snyman does not think the principle of legality
ever permits the extension of the scope of common-law crimes. How, then,
does he make sense of the above injunction in s 39(2)? According to him the
word ‘develop’ does not mean extending the scope of existing crimes.
‘Develop’ means the court could ‘clear up existing points of doubt in the
definition of crimes, . . . hold that certain conduct is not punishable in terms
of existing definitions of crimes, or perhaps even . . . fill an obvious lacuna in
the definition of a crime’ (Snyman at 679). According to Snyman it is an
accepted principle of law that the definition of the outer limits of liability
should not, without very good reason, be extended by analogy (ibid, my
emphasis). The use of analogy to the advantage of the accused by creating a
new defence or limiting the scope of a crime is, Snyman asserts, permissible
(ibid). To do otherwise leads to uncertainty and therefore flies in the face of
the legality principle.
But surely filling a lacuna is precisely what the court did to the definition
of rape in this case, though I would argue it did so incompletely. Snyman
himself concedes that analogy may be used with ‘very good reason’. What
better reason could there be than to render the law constitutional?
Furthermore, extending the scope of the crime in this circumstance was not
prejudicial to the accused as it was not applied to the accused himself but was
rather made available to future accused persons. Thus it does not lead to
uncertainty or vagueness, as the current state of the law is clearly expressed.
Certainty is further encouraged when the Constitutional Court interprets
the scope of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights so that law offending
these rights can be identified. In view of this, the court’s unwillingness in
Masiya to provide a detailed rights analysis is especially disappointing. This
criticism is echoed by Stu Woolman in ‘The amazing, vanishing Bill of
Rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ 762 at 768 (emphasis original):
‘What is wrong with Masiya? It never truly considers the direct application of
substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights to the challenged common-law rule
regarding the definition of rape. It never engages the content of the substantive
provisions of the Bill of Rights and thus never articulates constitutional rules
that amplify that content.’
South Africa has undergone a transition from ‘rule by law’ under apartheid
to ‘rule of law’ under constitutional supremacy (Brian Z Tamanaha On The
Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) 3, quoting Steven Mufson
‘Chinese movement seeks rule of law to keep government in check’
Washington Post 5 March 1995). If we are to take the adoption of
constitutional supremacy seriously, constitutional law cannot be viewed in
isolation, distinct from other areas of law. Constitutional principles need to
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be the lens through which all law, including the principle of legality, is
interpreted and understood. This statement should not be read by scaremon-
gers as signalling the end of legal certainty. The principle of legality is robust.
It has endured centuries of social and jurisprudential change and is capable of
adapting to and surviving through this new constitutional era too. The core
restraints of the principle can accommodate our increased understanding and
protection of fundamental rights.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
In order to support his stance that the principle of legality does not permit
extension of the scope of crimes, Snyman distinguishes between interpreta-
tion and innovation (Snyman at 678, and see also Hoctor op cit at 85).
According to this line of reasoning the former is the courts’ correct role while
the latter breaches the principle of legality and the separation of powers —
innovation is best left to the legislature.
However, it is necessary to recognize that ‘while the courts have drawn a
distinction between ‘‘legitimate interpretation and innovation’’, interpreta-
tion is not necessarily always devoid of, or distinct from, innovation’ (Phelps
& Kazee op cit at 353). In order to ensure the meaningful survival of our
common-law tradition and clear up areas of disagreement, courts will need
to be, and have been, innovative in their interpretations of the ambit of
crimes. Thus, additional components of crimes that have not previously been
recognized by courts will have to be recognized in order to ensure the law’s
relevance, such as locating obstruction of the police within the definition of
obstructing the course of justice. In this way the common law grows, in the
spirit of the Constitution, within the existing framework of crimes. If
behaviour cannot legitimately fit into an existing common-law crime, and
the existing definition is nonetheless constitutional as it stands, then it is up to
the legislature to intervene.
This approach to the principle of legality and the development of the
common law does not breach the separation of powers — it is a division of
labour that is in keeping with the conception of the separation of powers in
South Africa as a ‘constitutional dialogue’, with each arm of the state given
checking functions over the others (see Sandra Liebenberg ‘Socio-economic
rights’ in Matthew Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa (1999)
41–i at 41–10, and see Phelps & Kazee op cit at 354). Further, the legislature
is always free to intervene should it find that the court erred in its
interpretation of the common-law crimes. ‘[T]he doctrine of the separation
of powers, while suggesting good reasons why . . . lines must be drawn
(judicial non-accountability, institutional competence, etc), does not of itself
indicate precisely where they should be placed’ (Jamie Cassels ‘Judicial
activism and public interest litigation in India: Attempting the impossible?
’(1989) 37 American J of Comparative Law 495 at 513–14, cited by Liebenberg
op cit at 41–9-10). This collaborative and co-operative model contributes to
the smooth functioning and legitimacy of the operations of the state:
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‘A different conception [of the separation of powers] is needed which
emphasizes the need to develop a culture of openness, responsiveness and
justification in the interchange between the different branches of govern-
ment’ (Liebenberg op cit at 41–8).
The majority judgment in Masiya recognized that if courts cannot bring
the law in line with the Constitution then s 39(2) is rendered meaningless
(para 51). The Constitution is meant to be a document of practical
application that effects social change. Snyman’s interpretation of s 39(2)
would give this injunction mere lip service. Development of the common
law should of course be exercised with caution and deference to the other
arms of state. However, in instances where the legislature is dragging its feet,
as was the case with the Sexual Offences Bill, it is appropriate and desirable
that the court should intervene. The words of the Constitutional Court in
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para
109 are instructive in this regard:
‘The principle of the separation of powers . . . recognises the functional
independence of branches of government. On the other hand, the principle of
checks and balances . . . anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of
one branch on the terrain of another. No constitutional scheme can reflect a
complete separation of powers: the scheme is always one of partial separation.’
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COMMON-LAW DEFINITION
OF RAPE
Contrary to Snyman’s assertion, the common-law definition of rape was
unconstitutional. In fact one of the headings in his note, ‘The constitutional-
ity of the common-law definition of rape’ (Snyman at 682), is worded rather
curiously because he does not actually proceed to consider any kind of rights
analysis in reaching his conclusion that the definition of rape was
constitutional. Most of this part of his discussion focuses on the physiology of
male and female sex organs. Discussing the physiology of the species — even
if the same physiology is present ‘through the whole of the animal and even
through much of the vegetable world’ (ibid at 683) — is not, with respect, a
constitutional analysis and does not provide a legal basis for arguing that a
particular crime is constitutional. Furthermore, simply because men and
women have different sex organs does not mean that they experience
degradation, humiliation and violation differently or require different
protection.
Continuing his focus on the male and female anatomy, Snyman points out
that ‘[p]enile penetration of the vagina may result in the woman’s becoming pregnant’
(ibid, emphasis original; and see also Criminal Law (2008) 46: ‘[T]he main or
at least one of the main reasons for criminalising rape is to protect the woman
from becoming pregnant without her will’). This is a wholly irrelevant and
misplaced consideration. It shifts the focus away from the rape survivor to the
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unborn child. This harks back to the days when marital rape was not a crime
as the focus was placed on the male’s property rights in his wife: ‘[D]ebates
about raping husbands are predicated on the notion that a woman’s body is
property. This property is transferred to the husband on marriage’ (Joanna
Bourke Rape — A History from 1860 to the Present (2007) 328). A woman is
more than a vessel for childbirth or the property of her husband.
Furthermore, focusing on the risk of pregnancy rests the rationale of the
crime on a potential consequence. This is not consonant with the fact that rape
is a circumstance and not a consequence crime. (See Criminal Law (2002) 76:
‘Let us consider the example of rape: here the act consists simply of sexual
penetration. The result of this act (for example, the question whether or not
the woman became pregnant) is, for the purposes of determining liability for
the crime, irrelevant.’)
With respect to the finding of the majority to the contrary, the
common-law definition of rape is unconstitutional. This is so both because it
fails to meet the standard set in s 39(2) and because, to iterate the finding of
Langa CJ in para 80, it
‘fails to give full effect to the constitutional values of dignity, equality and
freedom: dignity through recognition of a violation; equality through equal
recognition of that violation; and freedom as rape negates not only dignity, but
bodily autonomy. All these concerns apply equally to men and women. . . .’
That is sufficient justification for the court to develop the common law.
This is even more pronounced considering the partial extension that the
court permitted was, rightly, not applied retrospectively to Mr Masiya
himself and thus did not fall foul of legality.
Snyman argues that the traditional definition of rape did not discriminate
unfairly against women and therefore did not require extension (Snyman at
678; Criminal Law (2008) 46). I submit respectfully that his focus is mistaken:
the issue is not whether it discriminates unfairly against women but whether
it discriminates unfairly against men and boys. The fact that the victim in this
case was female and not male should not have stopped the court from issuing
a gender-neutral order. In the ‘gay rights’ cases that have come before the
court remedies have been fashioned in a gender-neutral manner, regardless
of the gender of the parties before the court (for example, National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) regarding
the constitutionality of the common-law crime of sodomy; National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC),
where the court was asked to declare s 25 of the Aliens Control Act 96 of
1991 unconstitutional in that it unfairly discriminated against same-sex
couples; Gory v Kolver NO 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) regarding the constitution-
ality of s 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987; and Minister of Home
Affairs v Fourie: Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006
(1) SA 524 (CC) regarding the constitutionality of the common-law
definition of marriage and, to the extent that it was implicated, the
constitutionality of the definition of marriage in the Marriage Act 25 of
1961. See also Phelps & Kazee op cit at 348).
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL656
The revised definition of rape, which excludes men from being victims of
the crime, discriminates against some of the most vulnerable groups in
society (such as young boys, homosexuals and prisoners) by denying them
equal protection of, and recognition by, the law. The relevance of
vulnerability in deciding whether discrimination is unfair was clearly
described by O’Regan J in President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997
(4) SA 1 (CC) para 112: ‘The more vulnerable the group adversely affected
by the discrimination, the more likely it will be held to be unfair.’The partial
extension of the common-law definition of rape has resulted in the
anomalous situation of the Constitutional Court’s issuing an order that,
according to the above line of reasoning, can itself be challenged for being
unconstitutional (Woolman op cit 767n7).
THE EMOTIVE NATURE OF MASIYA
The emotive nature of the case is one explanation provided by Snyman for
why the court, in his view, allowed itself to infringe the principle of legality
and the doctrine of separation of powers. A list of quotes from the judgment
is provided by him in order to substantiate his point that the court was
unduly influenced by emotional considerations (Snyman at 680):
‘[O]n a close reading of Masiya it is noticeable how many emotionally charged,
and therefore vague, words and expressions are used by the judges. Examples
are ‘‘the crime of rape perpetuate[s] gender stereotypes and discrimination’’
(para 36); ‘‘humiliating’’ (para 26); ‘‘patriarchal stereotypes’’ (para 29); ‘‘the
abhorrence with which our society regards these pervasive but outrageous acts’’
(para 44); ‘‘degrading, humiliating and traumatic’’ (para 30); ‘‘gross humiliation
and indignity’’ (para 79); ‘‘feelings of righteousness’’ (para 9).’
He then points out (loc cit) that judges should not be allowed to extend the
operation of the criminal law based on ideological or emotional consider-
ations, making reference to S v Augustine 1986 (3) SA 294 (C) at 302I-J to
support this proposition:
‘There are always people to be found who invite and favour ‘‘extensions’’ by
the Court of the existing principles of the common law to encompass situations
which they feel ‘‘should’’ be encompassed, even if they have not hitherto been
so encompassed. I do not think the Courts should respond too readily to such
invitations. Fundamental innovations of this kind are for the Legislature . . .
and not the Courts.’
With respect, Masiya did not involve law that should be developed on
ideological and emotional grounds. It involved law that required development
in order to bring it into line with the Constitution. Much of the material that
courts confront involving criminal issues has an emotional or tragic
background. Recognizing the painful experiences of survivors and victims of
crimes is not tantamount to disregarding the law. The law and human
emotion and suffering are not mutually exclusive. What more palatable
words would Snyman have the courts use when describing the effects of
rape? Judges are not robots devoid of emotion, and simply recognizing the
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emotional impact of a crime does not necessarily mean the law is being
improperly applied.
The common-law definition of rape at stake in Masiya was unfairly
discriminatory. Thus the court could and should have intervened, which it
failed to do adequately by refusing to take the definition to its full,
gender-neutral, conclusion. The legitimate extension of the scope of
common-law crimes should be based on law, not emotion, and the supreme
law of our land is the Constitution. By failing to bring the law into line with
the Constitution the court failed in its duty to guard and promote the values
contained in the Bill of Rights.
CONCLUSION — A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT INDEED
One point on which Snyman and the present author clearly agree is that
Masiya sets a dangerous precedent. Snyman (at 685, and see Criminal Law
(2008) 47) seems to see it as signalling the end of legal certainty — a
free-for-all for the courts to do with the criminal law as they like. To support
this he provides three examples of crimes that the court could extend by
analogy applying the precedent set in Masiya: extending the crime of
housebreaking with intent to steal to include breaking into a motor vehicle;
extending the crime of arson to include setting fire to moveable property;
and extending the crime of theft to include theft of incorporeal things
(Snyman at 685–6).
There is a pivotal distinction between Masiya and the three examples he
provides: none of those examples involves definitions that are unconstitu-
tional. The common-law definition of rape was unconstitutional, and
therefore the court was obliged to intervene. It has been argued in this note
that the inclusion of the principle of legality in the Constitution provides a
basis for such intervention, by recognizing a new ground on which the court
can extend the scope of common-law crimes. If the Constitutional Court is
prohibited from intervening in order to bring the law in line with the rights
contained in the Bill of Rights, the concept of constitutional supremacy is
robbed of substance. Furthermore, the development of the definition of rape
could have been effected with the intention of the legislature in mind, as the
Bill, on which the legislature had so noticeably dragged its feet, was available
for the court to consult.
Two particular issues as they pertain to Masiya are noticeably separated in
Snyman’s discussion: the principle of legality and the constitutionality of the
common-law definition of rape. This is a fundamental distinction between
our stances, for I do not believe these issues are divisible. If in our
constitutional dispensation we are to take the notion of constitutional
supremacy seriously, all legal principles, even those as hallowed as legality,
need to be viewed through a constitutional lens. Even under a traditional
understanding of legality the courts have always had limited ability to
develop the scope of common-law crimes by recognizing new behaviour
that fits into the existing definition (such as theft of credit and obstruction of
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the police). In Masiya the court had no choice but to develop the law owing
to the fact that the definition as it stood was unconstitutional.
Masiya is a dangerous precedent because the court failed to raise its voice
in the constitutional dialogue that functions in South Africa between the
arms of state. There was no reason of logic or justice why rape should be
gender-specific. Furthermore, in line with the minority judgment in Masiya,
there was no rule of law that prohibited the court from executing a
gender-neutral extension.
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